Overview

SentinelOne's Deep Visibility provides real-time telemetry for threat hunting across your entire endpoint fleet. This guide covers practical threat hunting techniques, from basic queries to advanced IOC detection.

What You'll Learn

Deep Visibility query syntax and operators
Process tree analysis for attack detection
Hunting for persistence mechanisms
Lateral movement detection
Building custom detection rules
PowerShell API automation

Why Deep Visibility?

Traditional AV	SentinelOne Deep Visibility
Signature-based	Behavioral analysis
Post-infection alerts	Real-time telemetry
Limited forensics	Full process history
Manual investigation	Query-based hunting

Deep Visibility Query Basics

Deep Visibility uses a SQL-like query language to search endpoint telemetry.

Query Structure

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "powershell.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "-enc"

Common Operators

Operator	Description	Example
`=`	Exact match	`ProcessName = "cmd.exe"`
`Contains`	Substring match	`ProcessCmdLine Contains "mimikatz"`
`StartsWith`	Prefix match	`FilePath StartsWith "C:\Temp"`
`In`	Multiple values	`ProcessName In ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")`
`RegExp`	Regex match	`ProcessCmdLine RegExp "base64"`

Event Types

Process Creation      - New process started
Process Exit          - Process terminated
File Creation         - New file written
File Modification     - Existing file changed
Registry Key Creation - New registry key
Registry Value Set    - Registry value modified
Network Connection    - Outbound connection
DNS Query             - DNS resolution

Hunting for Suspicious Processes

Encoded PowerShell Commands

Attackers frequently use Base64-encoded PowerShell to evade detection:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "powershell.exe"
AND (
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "-enc" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "-EncodedCommand" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "-e " OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "FromBase64String"
)

Living Off the Land (LOLBins)

Hunt for abuse of legitimate Windows binaries:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName In (
    "certutil.exe",
    "bitsadmin.exe",
    "mshta.exe",
    "regsvr32.exe",
    "rundll32.exe",
    "wmic.exe",
    "msiexec.exe"
)
AND (
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "http" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "ftp" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "/transfer"
)

Suspicious Parent-Child Relationships

Detect unusual process spawning patterns:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ParentProcessName = "outlook.exe"
AND ProcessName In ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ParentProcessName = "winword.exe"
AND ProcessName Not In ("splwow64.exe")

Persistence Mechanism Detection

Scheduled Tasks

Hunt for malicious scheduled task creation:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "schtasks.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "/create"

More specific - tasks running from suspicious locations:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "schtasks.exe"
AND (
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "AppData" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "Temp" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "ProgramData" OR
    ProcessCmdLine RegExp "C:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\Downloads"
)

Registry Run Keys

Detect persistence via registry:

EventType = "Registry Value Set"
AND RegistryPath Contains "CurrentVersion\Run"

EventType = "Registry Value Set"
AND RegistryPath In (
    "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
    "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
    "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce",
    "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
)

WMI Event Subscriptions

Advanced persistence technique:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "wmic.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "EventConsumer"

Lateral Movement Detection

PsExec and Remote Execution

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName In ("psexec.exe", "psexec64.exe", "paexec.exe")

Service-based lateral movement:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "sc.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "\\\"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "create"

WMI Remote Execution

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "wmic.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "/node:"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "process call create"

Pass-the-Hash Indicators

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "sekurlsa.exe"
OR (
    ProcessName = "mimikatz.exe" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"
)

RDP Connections

EventType = "Network Connection"
AND DstPort = 3389
AND ConnectionStatus = "SUCCESS"

Credential Access Detection

LSASS Access

Credential dumping attempts:

EventType = "Process Access"
AND TargetProcessName = "lsass.exe"
AND SourceProcessName Not In (
    "csrss.exe",
    "wininit.exe",
    "services.exe"
)

SAM Database Access

EventType = "File Read"
AND FilePath Contains "system32\config\SAM"

Credential File Access

EventType = "File Read"
AND (
    FilePath Contains "Credentials" OR
    FilePath Contains ".rdp" OR
    FilePath Contains "ntds.dit" OR
    FileName RegExp "\.(ppk|pem|key)$"
)

Data Exfiltration Detection

Large Outbound Transfers

EventType = "Network Connection"
AND ConnectionDirection = "OUTBOUND"
AND NetworkBytes > 10000000

Cloud Storage Uploads

EventType = "DNS Query"
AND DnsQuery In (
    "*.dropbox.com",
    "*.drive.google.com",
    "*.onedrive.live.com",
    "*.mega.nz",
    "*.pastebin.com"
)

Archive Creation Before Exfil

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName In ("7z.exe", "rar.exe", "zip.exe", "tar.exe")
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "a "
| FollowedBy ProcessCreation
  WHERE ProcessCmdLine Contains "http"
  WITHIN 5 minutes

PowerShell API Integration

Authentication

function Connect-SentinelOne {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$ConsoleUrl,
 
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$ApiToken
    )
 
    $script:S1Session = @{
        BaseUrl = $ConsoleUrl.TrimEnd('/')
        Headers = @{
            "Authorization" = "ApiToken $ApiToken"
            "Content-Type"  = "application/json"
        }
    }
 
    # Verify connection
    try {
        $response = Invoke-RestMethod `
            -Uri "$($script:S1Session.BaseUrl)/web/api/v2.1/system/info" `
            -Headers $script:S1Session.Headers `
            -Method GET
 
        Write-Host "Connected to SentinelOne" -ForegroundColor Green
        Write-Host "  Version: $($response.data.build)"
        return $true
    }
    catch {
        Write-Error "Connection failed: $_"
        return $false
    }
}

Execute Deep Visibility Query

function Invoke-S1Query {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$Query,
 
        [string]$FromDate = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7).ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffZ"),
        [string]$ToDate = (Get-Date).ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffZ"),
        [int]$Limit = 100
    )
 
    $body = @{
        query     = $Query
        fromDate  = $FromDate
        toDate    = $ToDate
        limit     = $Limit
    } | ConvertTo-Json
 
    $response = Invoke-RestMethod `
        -Uri "$($script:S1Session.BaseUrl)/web/api/v2.1/dv/query" `
        -Headers $script:S1Session.Headers `
        -Method POST `
        -Body $body
 
    return $response.data
}
 
# Usage
$results = Invoke-S1Query -Query 'EventType = "Process Creation" AND ProcessName = "powershell.exe"'
$results | Select-Object endpointName, processCmd, createdAt

Automated Threat Hunt

function Start-ThreatHunt {
    param(
        [hashtable]$Queries,
        [string]$OutputPath = ".\hunt-results"
    )
 
    New-Item -Path $OutputPath -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null
 
    $findings = @()
 
    foreach ($hunt in $Queries.GetEnumerator()) {
        Write-Host "Running hunt: $($hunt.Key)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
 
        $results = Invoke-S1Query -Query $hunt.Value
 
        if ($results.Count -gt 0) {
            Write-Host "  Found $($results.Count) matches" -ForegroundColor Yellow
 
            $findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
                Hunt    = $hunt.Key
                Query   = $hunt.Value
                Count   = $results.Count
                Results = $results
            }
 
            # Export results
            $results | Export-Csv `
                -Path "$OutputPath\$($hunt.Key -replace ' ', '-').csv" `
                -NoTypeInformation
        }
        else {
            Write-Host "  No matches" -ForegroundColor Green
        }
    }
 
    return $findings
}
 
# Define hunts
$hunts = @{
    "Encoded PowerShell" = 'EventType = "Process Creation" AND ProcessName = "powershell.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "-enc"'
    "LOLBin Download"    = 'EventType = "Process Creation" AND ProcessName = "certutil.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "http"'
    "Suspicious Tasks"   = 'EventType = "Process Creation" AND ProcessName = "schtasks.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "AppData"'
}
 
# Execute hunt
$results = Start-ThreatHunt -Queries $hunts

Building Custom Detection Rules

Star Custom Rule

Create rules from successful hunts:

function New-S1CustomRule {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$Name,
 
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$Query,
 
        [ValidateSet("Low", "Medium", "High", "Critical")]
        [string]$Severity = "Medium",
 
        [string]$Description
    )
 
    $body = @{
        data = @{
            name        = $Name
            query       = $Query
            severity    = $Severity
            description = $Description
            enabled     = $true
        }
    } | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5
 
    $response = Invoke-RestMethod `
        -Uri "$($script:S1Session.BaseUrl)/web/api/v2.1/star-custom-rules" `
        -Headers $script:S1Session.Headers `
        -Method POST `
        -Body $body
 
    Write-Host "Rule '$Name' created" -ForegroundColor Green
    return $response.data
}

Example Rules

# Detect Mimikatz
New-S1CustomRule `
    -Name "Mimikatz Execution Detected" `
    -Query 'ProcessCmdLine Contains "sekurlsa" OR ProcessCmdLine Contains "mimikatz"' `
    -Severity "Critical" `
    -Description "Detects Mimikatz credential dumping tool"
 
# Detect reverse shells
New-S1CustomRule `
    -Name "Potential Reverse Shell" `
    -Query 'ProcessCmdLine RegExp "nc.*-e|ncat.*-e|bash.*-i.*>&"' `
    -Severity "High" `
    -Description "Detects common reverse shell patterns"

Ransomware Detection Queries

Mass File Encryption

EventType = "File Modification"
| GroupBy EndpointName, ProcessName
  Having Count > 100
  Within 1 minute

Known Ransomware Extensions

EventType = "File Creation"
AND (
    FileName EndsWith ".encrypted" OR
    FileName EndsWith ".locked" OR
    FileName EndsWith ".crypto" OR
    FileName RegExp "\.[a-z]{5,10}$"
)
| GroupBy EndpointName
  Having Count > 50

Shadow Copy Deletion

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND (
    (ProcessName = "vssadmin.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "delete shadows") OR
    (ProcessName = "wmic.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "shadowcopy delete") OR
    (ProcessName = "bcdedit.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "recoveryenabled no")
)

Best Practices

Start with known-good - Understand normal before hunting abnormal
Tune for environment - Whitelist legitimate admin tools
Document findings - Keep hunt notebooks with queries and results
Automate repeatable hunts - Schedule weekly hunt routines
Share IOCs - Feed findings back into SIEM and firewall rules
Practice on red team exercises - Validate detection coverage

Query Reference Card

Use Case	Query Pattern
Process by name	`ProcessName = "malware.exe"`
Command line search	`ProcessCmdLine Contains "suspicious"`
File in location	`FilePath StartsWith "C:\Temp"`
Network to IP	`DstIp = "192.168.1.100"`
DNS lookup	`DnsQuery Contains "evil.com"`
Registry persistence	`RegistryPath Contains "CurrentVersion\Run"`
Time-bounded	`CreatedAt > "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"`

Next Steps

Overview

What You'll Learn

Deep Visibility query syntax and operators
Process tree analysis for attack detection
Hunting for persistence mechanisms
Lateral movement detection
Building custom detection rules
PowerShell API automation

Why Deep Visibility?

Traditional AV	SentinelOne Deep Visibility
Signature-based	Behavioral analysis
Post-infection alerts	Real-time telemetry
Limited forensics	Full process history
Manual investigation	Query-based hunting

Deep Visibility Query Basics

Deep Visibility uses a SQL-like query language to search endpoint telemetry.

Query Structure

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "powershell.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "-enc"

Common Operators

Operator	Description	Example
`=`	Exact match	`ProcessName = "cmd.exe"`
`Contains`	Substring match	`ProcessCmdLine Contains "mimikatz"`
`StartsWith`	Prefix match	`FilePath StartsWith "C:\Temp"`
`In`	Multiple values	`ProcessName In ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")`
`RegExp`	Regex match	`ProcessCmdLine RegExp "base64"`

Event Types

Process Creation      - New process started
Process Exit          - Process terminated
File Creation         - New file written
File Modification     - Existing file changed
Registry Key Creation - New registry key
Registry Value Set    - Registry value modified
Network Connection    - Outbound connection
DNS Query             - DNS resolution

Hunting for Suspicious Processes

Encoded PowerShell Commands

Attackers frequently use Base64-encoded PowerShell to evade detection:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "powershell.exe"
AND (
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "-enc" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "-EncodedCommand" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "-e " OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "FromBase64String"
)

Living Off the Land (LOLBins)

Hunt for abuse of legitimate Windows binaries:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName In (
    "certutil.exe",
    "bitsadmin.exe",
    "mshta.exe",
    "regsvr32.exe",
    "rundll32.exe",
    "wmic.exe",
    "msiexec.exe"
)
AND (
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "http" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "ftp" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "/transfer"
)

Suspicious Parent-Child Relationships

Detect unusual process spawning patterns:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ParentProcessName = "outlook.exe"
AND ProcessName In ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ParentProcessName = "winword.exe"
AND ProcessName Not In ("splwow64.exe")

Persistence Mechanism Detection

Scheduled Tasks

Hunt for malicious scheduled task creation:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "schtasks.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "/create"

More specific - tasks running from suspicious locations:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "schtasks.exe"
AND (
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "AppData" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "Temp" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "ProgramData" OR
    ProcessCmdLine RegExp "C:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\Downloads"
)

Registry Run Keys

Detect persistence via registry:

EventType = "Registry Value Set"
AND RegistryPath Contains "CurrentVersion\Run"

EventType = "Registry Value Set"
AND RegistryPath In (
    "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
    "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
    "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce",
    "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
)

WMI Event Subscriptions

Advanced persistence technique:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "wmic.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "EventConsumer"

Lateral Movement Detection

PsExec and Remote Execution

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName In ("psexec.exe", "psexec64.exe", "paexec.exe")

Service-based lateral movement:

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "sc.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "\\\"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "create"

WMI Remote Execution

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "wmic.exe"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "/node:"
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "process call create"

Pass-the-Hash Indicators

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName = "sekurlsa.exe"
OR (
    ProcessName = "mimikatz.exe" OR
    ProcessCmdLine Contains "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"
)

RDP Connections

EventType = "Network Connection"
AND DstPort = 3389
AND ConnectionStatus = "SUCCESS"

Credential Access Detection

LSASS Access

Credential dumping attempts:

EventType = "Process Access"
AND TargetProcessName = "lsass.exe"
AND SourceProcessName Not In (
    "csrss.exe",
    "wininit.exe",
    "services.exe"
)

SAM Database Access

EventType = "File Read"
AND FilePath Contains "system32\config\SAM"

Credential File Access

EventType = "File Read"
AND (
    FilePath Contains "Credentials" OR
    FilePath Contains ".rdp" OR
    FilePath Contains "ntds.dit" OR
    FileName RegExp "\.(ppk|pem|key)$"
)

Data Exfiltration Detection

Large Outbound Transfers

EventType = "Network Connection"
AND ConnectionDirection = "OUTBOUND"
AND NetworkBytes > 10000000

Cloud Storage Uploads

EventType = "DNS Query"
AND DnsQuery In (
    "*.dropbox.com",
    "*.drive.google.com",
    "*.onedrive.live.com",
    "*.mega.nz",
    "*.pastebin.com"
)

Archive Creation Before Exfil

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND ProcessName In ("7z.exe", "rar.exe", "zip.exe", "tar.exe")
AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "a "
| FollowedBy ProcessCreation
  WHERE ProcessCmdLine Contains "http"
  WITHIN 5 minutes

PowerShell API Integration

Authentication

function Connect-SentinelOne {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$ConsoleUrl,
 
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$ApiToken
    )
 
    $script:S1Session = @{
        BaseUrl = $ConsoleUrl.TrimEnd('/')
        Headers = @{
            "Authorization" = "ApiToken $ApiToken"
            "Content-Type"  = "application/json"
        }
    }
 
    # Verify connection
    try {
        $response = Invoke-RestMethod `
            -Uri "$($script:S1Session.BaseUrl)/web/api/v2.1/system/info" `
            -Headers $script:S1Session.Headers `
            -Method GET
 
        Write-Host "Connected to SentinelOne" -ForegroundColor Green
        Write-Host "  Version: $($response.data.build)"
        return $true
    }
    catch {
        Write-Error "Connection failed: $_"
        return $false
    }
}

Execute Deep Visibility Query

function Invoke-S1Query {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$Query,
 
        [string]$FromDate = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7).ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffZ"),
        [string]$ToDate = (Get-Date).ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffZ"),
        [int]$Limit = 100
    )
 
    $body = @{
        query     = $Query
        fromDate  = $FromDate
        toDate    = $ToDate
        limit     = $Limit
    } | ConvertTo-Json
 
    $response = Invoke-RestMethod `
        -Uri "$($script:S1Session.BaseUrl)/web/api/v2.1/dv/query" `
        -Headers $script:S1Session.Headers `
        -Method POST `
        -Body $body
 
    return $response.data
}
 
# Usage
$results = Invoke-S1Query -Query 'EventType = "Process Creation" AND ProcessName = "powershell.exe"'
$results | Select-Object endpointName, processCmd, createdAt

Automated Threat Hunt

function Start-ThreatHunt {
    param(
        [hashtable]$Queries,
        [string]$OutputPath = ".\hunt-results"
    )
 
    New-Item -Path $OutputPath -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null
 
    $findings = @()
 
    foreach ($hunt in $Queries.GetEnumerator()) {
        Write-Host "Running hunt: $($hunt.Key)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
 
        $results = Invoke-S1Query -Query $hunt.Value
 
        if ($results.Count -gt 0) {
            Write-Host "  Found $($results.Count) matches" -ForegroundColor Yellow
 
            $findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
                Hunt    = $hunt.Key
                Query   = $hunt.Value
                Count   = $results.Count
                Results = $results
            }
 
            # Export results
            $results | Export-Csv `
                -Path "$OutputPath\$($hunt.Key -replace ' ', '-').csv" `
                -NoTypeInformation
        }
        else {
            Write-Host "  No matches" -ForegroundColor Green
        }
    }
 
    return $findings
}
 
# Define hunts
$hunts = @{
    "Encoded PowerShell" = 'EventType = "Process Creation" AND ProcessName = "powershell.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "-enc"'
    "LOLBin Download"    = 'EventType = "Process Creation" AND ProcessName = "certutil.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "http"'
    "Suspicious Tasks"   = 'EventType = "Process Creation" AND ProcessName = "schtasks.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "AppData"'
}
 
# Execute hunt
$results = Start-ThreatHunt -Queries $hunts

Building Custom Detection Rules

Star Custom Rule

Create rules from successful hunts:

function New-S1CustomRule {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$Name,
 
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$Query,
 
        [ValidateSet("Low", "Medium", "High", "Critical")]
        [string]$Severity = "Medium",
 
        [string]$Description
    )
 
    $body = @{
        data = @{
            name        = $Name
            query       = $Query
            severity    = $Severity
            description = $Description
            enabled     = $true
        }
    } | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5
 
    $response = Invoke-RestMethod `
        -Uri "$($script:S1Session.BaseUrl)/web/api/v2.1/star-custom-rules" `
        -Headers $script:S1Session.Headers `
        -Method POST `
        -Body $body
 
    Write-Host "Rule '$Name' created" -ForegroundColor Green
    return $response.data
}

Example Rules

# Detect Mimikatz
New-S1CustomRule `
    -Name "Mimikatz Execution Detected" `
    -Query 'ProcessCmdLine Contains "sekurlsa" OR ProcessCmdLine Contains "mimikatz"' `
    -Severity "Critical" `
    -Description "Detects Mimikatz credential dumping tool"
 
# Detect reverse shells
New-S1CustomRule `
    -Name "Potential Reverse Shell" `
    -Query 'ProcessCmdLine RegExp "nc.*-e|ncat.*-e|bash.*-i.*>&"' `
    -Severity "High" `
    -Description "Detects common reverse shell patterns"

Ransomware Detection Queries

Mass File Encryption

EventType = "File Modification"
| GroupBy EndpointName, ProcessName
  Having Count > 100
  Within 1 minute

Known Ransomware Extensions

EventType = "File Creation"
AND (
    FileName EndsWith ".encrypted" OR
    FileName EndsWith ".locked" OR
    FileName EndsWith ".crypto" OR
    FileName RegExp "\.[a-z]{5,10}$"
)
| GroupBy EndpointName
  Having Count > 50

Shadow Copy Deletion

EventType = "Process Creation"
AND (
    (ProcessName = "vssadmin.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "delete shadows") OR
    (ProcessName = "wmic.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "shadowcopy delete") OR
    (ProcessName = "bcdedit.exe" AND ProcessCmdLine Contains "recoveryenabled no")
)

Best Practices

Start with known-good - Understand normal before hunting abnormal
Tune for environment - Whitelist legitimate admin tools
Document findings - Keep hunt notebooks with queries and results
Automate repeatable hunts - Schedule weekly hunt routines
Share IOCs - Feed findings back into SIEM and firewall rules
Practice on red team exercises - Validate detection coverage

Query Reference Card

Use Case	Query Pattern
Process by name	`ProcessName = "malware.exe"`
Command line search	`ProcessCmdLine Contains "suspicious"`
File in location	`FilePath StartsWith "C:\Temp"`
Network to IP	`DstIp = "192.168.1.100"`
DNS lookup	`DnsQuery Contains "evil.com"`
Registry persistence	`RegistryPath Contains "CurrentVersion\Run"`
Time-bounded	`CreatedAt > "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"`

Prerequisites

Overview

What You'll Learn

Why Deep Visibility?

Deep Visibility Query Basics

Query Structure

Common Operators

Event Types

Hunting for Suspicious Processes

Encoded PowerShell Commands

Living Off the Land (LOLBins)

Suspicious Parent-Child Relationships

Persistence Mechanism Detection

Scheduled Tasks

Registry Run Keys

WMI Event Subscriptions

Lateral Movement Detection

PsExec and Remote Execution

WMI Remote Execution

Pass-the-Hash Indicators

RDP Connections

Credential Access Detection

LSASS Access

SAM Database Access

Credential File Access

Data Exfiltration Detection

Large Outbound Transfers

Cloud Storage Uploads

Archive Creation Before Exfil

PowerShell API Integration

Authentication

Execute Deep Visibility Query

Automated Threat Hunt

Building Custom Detection Rules

Star Custom Rule

Example Rules

Ransomware Detection Queries

Mass File Encryption

Known Ransomware Extensions

Shadow Copy Deletion

Best Practices

Query Reference Card

Next Steps

Prerequisites

Overview

What You'll Learn

Why Deep Visibility?

Deep Visibility Query Basics

Query Structure

Common Operators

Event Types

Hunting for Suspicious Processes

Encoded PowerShell Commands

Living Off the Land (LOLBins)

Suspicious Parent-Child Relationships

Persistence Mechanism Detection

Scheduled Tasks

Registry Run Keys

WMI Event Subscriptions

Lateral Movement Detection

PsExec and Remote Execution

WMI Remote Execution

Pass-the-Hash Indicators

RDP Connections

Credential Access Detection

LSASS Access

SAM Database Access

Credential File Access

Data Exfiltration Detection

Large Outbound Transfers

Cloud Storage Uploads

Archive Creation Before Exfil

PowerShell API Integration

Authentication

Execute Deep Visibility Query

Automated Threat Hunt

Building Custom Detection Rules

Star Custom Rule

Example Rules

Ransomware Detection Queries