Overview
Cybersecurity researchers at Seqrite Labs have disclosed details of a new China-aligned cyber espionage campaign dubbed Operation Dragon Weave. The campaign is targeting officials and citizens in the Czech Republic and Taiwan, delivering the AdaptixC2 post-exploitation agent to establish persistent access within high-value organizations across government, research, academic, technology, and financial sectors.
The campaign represents a notable escalation in Chinese-aligned threat actor operations against European and Asia-Pacific targets, with researchers observing overlaps with previously documented China-nexus APT groups including Tropic Trooper (APT23/Earth Centaur).
Campaign Details
Attribution
Operation Dragon Weave is attributed to multiple China-aligned threat actor groups, suggesting a coordinated operation rather than a single actor. The simultaneous targeting of both Czech Republic (European Union member state) and Taiwan (geopolitically sensitive vis-à-vis China) indicates a strategic intelligence-gathering mandate spanning multiple Chinese intelligence priorities.
Targeted Sectors
| Country | Targeted Sectors |
|---|---|
| Czech Republic | Government agencies, Research institutions, Academic organizations, Technology companies, Financial services |
| Taiwan | Government entities, Financial services, Academic institutions, Technology sector, Defense-adjacent organizations |
The breadth of targeting suggests the campaign aims to collect intelligence across multiple domains simultaneously — political, scientific, financial, and technological — consistent with Chinese state-sponsored intelligence priorities in 2026.
Technical Analysis: AdaptixC2
What Is AdaptixC2?
AdaptixC2 is a modular command and control (C2) framework that has been increasingly observed in campaigns attributed to China-aligned threat actors throughout 2025–2026. Once deployed on a compromised system, AdaptixC2 provides attackers with:
- Persistent remote access — survives reboots via multiple persistence mechanisms including scheduled tasks, registry run keys, and service installation
- Lateral movement capabilities — enables propagation throughout the target network using credential harvesting and pass-the-hash techniques
- Data exfiltration — facilitates extraction of sensitive documents, credentials, and intelligence data
- Modular architecture — allows attackers to load additional capability modules as needed without re-infection
- Encrypted C2 communications — blends with legitimate HTTPS traffic to evade detection
Delivery Mechanism
The campaign uses spear-phishing emails containing weaponized documents as the initial infection vector. Targets receive carefully crafted emails relevant to their professional roles — government officials receive policy documents, researchers receive academic papers, financial professionals receive market analyses — that when opened execute malicious code installing the AdaptixC2 agent silently.
Spear-Phishing Email (targeted, role-relevant lure)
↓
Weaponized Document (exploits Office vulnerability or macro)
↓
AdaptixC2 Agent Installation (silent, background execution)
↓
Persistent Remote Access Established
↓
Lateral Movement + Intelligence Collection
↓
Long-Term Espionage + Exfiltration
Geopolitical Context
The targeting of Czech Republic and Taiwan reflects specific Chinese strategic intelligence interests:
Czech Republic:
- EU member state with access to European political and policy intelligence
- Home to significant defense research and technology institutions
- The Czech government has previously taken positions critical of Chinese intelligence practices, making it a target of retaliatory intelligence collection efforts
- Czech academic institutions hold valuable research data in semiconductor technology and physics
Taiwan:
- The highest-priority geopolitical target for Chinese intelligence given Beijing's claims on Taiwan's sovereignty
- Advanced semiconductor and technology sector — significant economic and industrial intelligence value (TSMC ecosystem, supply chain data)
- Government communications, military planning, and foreign policy discussions are extremely high-value targets
- Taiwan's international relationships and US defense cooperation make it a persistent collection priority
The coordinated targeting of both geographies suggests this campaign serves broad PRC strategic intelligence objectives — European intelligence from Czech Republic, Asia-Pacific and semiconductor intelligence from Taiwan.
Connection to Known APT Groups
Seqrite Labs researchers identified overlaps with previously documented China-nexus APT groups:
- Tropic Trooper (APT23/Earth Centaur) — A well-documented Chinese APT with a history of targeting Taiwan's government and defense sectors. The use of AdaptixC2 in recent Tropic Trooper campaigns is documented.
- GopherWhisper — A China-linked group recently observed abusing legitimate services in government attacks across Asia-Pacific (April 2026)
This convergence of tooling and targeting patterns suggests either direct coordination between Chinese intelligence-aligned groups or shared tooling distribution within the Chinese APT ecosystem.
Indicators of Compromise
Organizations should monitor for:
- Spear-phishing emails with document attachments referencing Czech or Taiwan government, defense, or academic topics
- Suspicious macro execution from Word, Excel, or PowerPoint documents originating from external senders
- AdaptixC2 network traffic signatures — beacon patterns to unfamiliar external IPs over HTTPS
- Unexpected PowerShell, cmd.exe, or mshta.exe processes spawned from Office applications
- Anomalous scheduled task or service creation on workstations and servers
- Lateral movement indicators: unusual SMB connections between workstations, pass-the-hash patterns
Recommendations
- Email gateway filtering — Enable advanced threat protection for document attachments from external senders; sandbox all Office documents before delivery
- Macro policy hardening — Disable Office macros from internet-sourced documents via Group Policy (MOTW enforcement)
- Threat hunting — Search for AdaptixC2 IOCs published by Seqrite Labs in endpoint and network telemetry
- Patch management — Ensure all systems are current — spear-phishing campaigns often pair with client-side exploits for unpatched applications
- Privileged access hardening — Implement least-privilege and just-in-time access for high-value accounts that would be targets for lateral movement
- Security awareness training — Brief staff in government, research, and financial sectors on targeted spear-phishing risks specific to their roles
Key Takeaways
- Operation Dragon Weave is a China-aligned APT campaign targeting Czech Republic and Taiwan via the AdaptixC2 post-exploitation framework
- Targeted sectors span government, research, academia, technology, and finance — indicating a broad intelligence collection mandate
- Delivery is via spear-phishing with weaponized documents; email security controls and Office macro policy are the primary defensive levers
- The campaign shows overlaps with known China-nexus groups including Tropic Trooper, suggesting coordinated PRC-affiliated operations
- Simultaneous European and Asia-Pacific targeting reflects multi-region Chinese strategic intelligence collection priorities
Sources
- The Hacker News — China-Aligned Groups Ramp Up Attacks: Dragon Weave Hits Czech Republic & Taiwan
- Seqrite Labs — Operation Dragon Weave Research Report