NEWS

Cloudflare Q3 2026: 18.2 Million Network-Layer DDoS Attacks, but Giant Attacks Shrink

Cloudflare mitigated 18.2M network-layer DDoS attacks in Q3, up 38% quarter over quarter, as short-burst swarms replaced record-breaking floods.

Dylan H.

News Desk

October 31, 2026
3 min read
Cloudflare Q3 2026: 18.2 Million Network-Layer DDoS Attacks, but Giant Attacks Shrink

Overview

Cloudflare's Q3 2026 DDoS Threat Report, published October 29, 2026, shows attack volume still climbing while the character of attacks changes: more swarms, fewer giants.

Headline Numbers

MetricQ3 2026
Network-layer (L3/L4) DDoS attacks mitigated18.2 million
HTTP DDoS requests mitigated14.4 trillion
Average network-layer attacks per hour~8,226 (about one every 0.44 seconds)
Network-layer traffic mitigated272.6 PB
HTTP-layer traffic mitigated95.1 PB

The network-layer total is up about 38% from Q2 (13.2 million) and roughly 3x year over year.

Smaller, Shorter, More Frequent

  • 96% of network-layer attacks ended within ten minutes
  • 98% stayed below 1 Gbps
  • Attacks above 1 Tbps fell from 805 in Q2 to 251 in Q3, a drop of nearly 69%
  • Cloudflare observed no record-breaking attacks this quarter

Cloudflare ties the pattern to DDoS-for-hire "booter" services, which favor high volumes of short, cheap attacks over a few huge ones. Short bursts are harder to catch with manual or on-demand mitigation because they end before an analyst can respond.

Vector Shifts

  • CLDAP attacks collapsed by about 99.5% quarter over quarter, to 0.05% of network-layer attacks
  • DNS amplification rose 215% to 3.43% of attacks
  • Other UDP floods grew from 14.06% to 31.31% of attacks
  • Mirai-classified traffic peaked in August at 57.23 PB, around 46.5% of all network-layer bytes mitigated in Q3, with new variants such as Dysphoria and Evooo1Bot flagged

What Defenders Should Do

  1. Use always-on, automated mitigation. With most attacks ending in minutes, on-demand scrubbing and human-in-the-loop response are too slow.
  2. Rate-limit and filter UDP at the edge, and close or restrict unneeded UDP services.
  3. Lock down open resolvers and other amplification-capable services you operate.
  4. Harden IoT and edge devices. Mirai-family botnets still supply much of the attack capacity, so change default credentials and patch exposed devices.
  5. Alert on short bursts, not only sustained saturation, so repeated small attacks are visible in monitoring.

Key Takeaways

  • Attack count is rising sharply even as the largest attacks decline
  • Booter-style swarms favor automation on both the attacker and defender side
  • Mirai variants remain a major source of attack traffic

Sources