NEWS

Huntress Dissects EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365, Phishing Kits That Steal Microsoft 365 Sessions

Three kits capture and replay M365 tokens via device-code phishing and AiTM proxies, so completed MFA is not proof of a trusted session. Detection tips inside.

Dylan H.

News Desk

November 17, 2026
2 min read
Huntress Dissects EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365, Phishing Kits That Steal Microsoft 365 Sessions

What happened

Huntress researchers published an analysis of three phishing kits built to steal and replay Microsoft 365 sessions: EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365. BleepingComputer carried the writeup as sponsored content from Huntress, so treat it as vendor research.

The kits

KitApproach
EvilTokensSeen in early 2026 in a device-code phishing campaign using the Railway platform as a token-harvesting and replay engine. Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit and the FBI later contributed to the arrest of one alleged operator.
Knight OfficeAdversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) kit that steals valid session tokens and feeds them into an operator console for replay and persistence across tenant accounts.
Kali365Phishing-as-a-Service with one control panel. Captures tokens through device-code flows and reverse-proxy lures, replays them, keeps access, and includes built-in AI features.

How the attacks work

  • Device-code phishing: the victim signs in on the real Microsoft page and enters a code, so no credentials ever go to a fake site. The attacker captures the resulting authorization.
  • AiTM: the attacker relays the login in real time. The victim completes MFA, and the attacker keeps the session.
  • Replay: the stolen token is replayed into a live session, giving access to mail and cloud resources without the password or MFA again.

The key lesson from the research is that completed MFA alone does not make a session trustworthy.

Detection

  • Look for successful sign-ins from unfamiliar cloud infrastructure.
  • Hunt for device-code authentication and automated token refresh.
  • Review newly registered devices, authentication methods and mailbox activity.
  • Correlate the full chain from lure to token issuance to mailbox activity instead of relying on one signal.

Containment

  1. Revoke refresh tokens, then remove unauthorized devices and Windows Hello credentials.
  2. Restrict or block device-code authentication where it is not needed, for example with Conditional Access.
  3. Check mailbox forwarding rules and outbound phishing sent from the account.
  4. Keep hunting after the phishing domain goes offline, since replayed tokens can outlive the lure.

Sources