What happened
Huntress researchers published an analysis of three phishing kits built to steal and replay Microsoft 365 sessions: EvilTokens, Knight Office and Kali365. BleepingComputer carried the writeup as sponsored content from Huntress, so treat it as vendor research.
The kits
| Kit | Approach |
|---|---|
| EvilTokens | Seen in early 2026 in a device-code phishing campaign using the Railway platform as a token-harvesting and replay engine. Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit and the FBI later contributed to the arrest of one alleged operator. |
| Knight Office | Adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) kit that steals valid session tokens and feeds them into an operator console for replay and persistence across tenant accounts. |
| Kali365 | Phishing-as-a-Service with one control panel. Captures tokens through device-code flows and reverse-proxy lures, replays them, keeps access, and includes built-in AI features. |
How the attacks work
- Device-code phishing: the victim signs in on the real Microsoft page and enters a code, so no credentials ever go to a fake site. The attacker captures the resulting authorization.
- AiTM: the attacker relays the login in real time. The victim completes MFA, and the attacker keeps the session.
- Replay: the stolen token is replayed into a live session, giving access to mail and cloud resources without the password or MFA again.
The key lesson from the research is that completed MFA alone does not make a session trustworthy.
Detection
- Look for successful sign-ins from unfamiliar cloud infrastructure.
- Hunt for device-code authentication and automated token refresh.
- Review newly registered devices, authentication methods and mailbox activity.
- Correlate the full chain from lure to token issuance to mailbox activity instead of relying on one signal.
Containment
- Revoke refresh tokens, then remove unauthorized devices and Windows Hello credentials.
- Restrict or block device-code authentication where it is not needed, for example with Conditional Access.
- Check mailbox forwarding rules and outbound phishing sent from the account.
- Keep hunting after the phishing domain goes offline, since replayed tokens can outlive the lure.
