Executive Summary
A critical authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2025-63823) has been disclosed in the My Safetipin Android Application version 5.2.1. The app, designed to help users navigate personal safety and track safe routes, contains hardcoded credentials in its authentication module — allowing remote attackers to bypass authentication entirely and gain unauthorized access to any user account.
CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)
The vulnerability stems from static credentials embedded directly into the APK binary. Any attacker who reverse-engineers the application — a trivial process using freely available tooling — can extract these credentials and use them to authenticate as arbitrary users without their passwords. This represents a systemic flaw affecting all installations of version 5.2.1.
Vulnerability Overview
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-63823 |
| CVSS Score | 9.8 (Critical) |
| Type | Hardcoded Credentials / Authentication Bypass |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Privileges Required | None |
| User Interaction | None |
| Scope | All user accounts in the application |
| Affected Version | My Safetipin Android Application 5.2.1 |
About My Safetipin
Safetipin is a personal safety application designed to help individuals — particularly women and vulnerable communities — assess the safety of locations, plan safe routes, and share location data with trusted contacts. The app processes sensitive personal safety data including:
- Real-time GPS location tracking
- Emergency contact information
- Safe route history and travel patterns
- User-generated safety scores for locations
The sensitivity of this data makes the authentication bypass particularly severe.
Technical Details
Hardcoded Credentials — What They Mean
Hardcoded credentials occur when developers embed API keys, passwords, tokens, or authentication secrets directly in application source code or compiled binaries rather than retrieving them from secure runtime sources. In Android APKs, these can be trivially extracted:
# APK reverse engineering (public tools)
apktool d MySafetipin.apk -o output/
jadx -d jadx_output/ MySafetipin.apk
# Search for hardcoded strings
grep -r "password\|secret\|api_key\|token\|auth" jadx_output/ --include="*.java"
strings classes.dex | grep -E "(Bearer|Basic|secret|password)"Once extracted, an attacker can replay these credentials against the application's API endpoints to authenticate as any user without their actual password.
Attack Scenario
1. Attacker downloads My Safetipin APK (publicly available on Google Play)
2. Decompiles APK using jadx or apktool (takes ~60 seconds)
3. Extracts hardcoded credentials from authentication module
4. Crafts API requests using extracted credentials to authenticate as target users
5. Gains full access to victim accounts: location history, contacts, safe routes
6. Can track victim's real-time location or historical movement patterns
Why This Is Especially Dangerous for Safetipin
The nature of Safetipin's user base — people who rely on the app for personal safety in potentially dangerous situations — makes unauthorized account access particularly harmful:
- Location stalking: Attackers can access real-time and historical GPS data
- Safe route exposure: Patterns of movement can be used to predict and intercept users
- Emergency contact harvesting: Personal contact data exposed
- Trust exploitation: The app is used by users who believe their data is secured
Impact Assessment
| Impact | Description |
|---|---|
| Authentication Bypass | Remote access to any user account without credentials |
| Location Privacy Violation | Access to real-time GPS tracking and route history |
| Personal Safety Risk | Stalking, interception, or targeting of vulnerable users |
| Data Exfiltration | Extraction of all personal safety data for any account |
| Mass Account Compromise | Single set of hardcoded credentials affects all users |
Remediation
For Users
- Update the application immediately — check Google Play for the latest version
- Revoke app permissions (Location, Contacts) until an update is available: Settings > Apps > My Safetipin > Permissions
- Change your in-app password after updating to force token invalidation
- Be aware that historical location data may have been accessible during the vulnerability window
For the Vendor (Safetipin)
- Remove hardcoded credentials from the APK immediately
- Rotate all exposed credentials server-side — the existing static credentials should be invalidated even after removal from the app
- Implement runtime credential retrieval — fetch secrets from a secure server at runtime, not from the binary
- Conduct a full mobile security audit following OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS)
- Invalidate all existing sessions to force re-authentication after the fix is deployed
OWASP Mobile Top 10 Reference
This vulnerability maps to M2: Insecure Data Storage and M9: Insecure Authentication in the OWASP Mobile Application Security Top 10.
# OWASP MASVS Level 1 requirement (MSTG-AUTH-9)
# The app must not use hardcoded credentials for authentication
# Test: Decompile APK and search for credentials in sourceIndicators of Compromise
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
| Unusual API authentication activity | Logins from unexpected IP addresses or geolocations |
| Multiple failed authentications followed by success | Credential stuffing using extracted hardcoded credentials |
| Unexpected location data access | API calls accessing location history without user session |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| (Disclosure date) | CVE-2025-63823 published to NVD |
| 2026-08-06 | CosmicBytez Labs advisory published |
| Pending | Vendor patch confirmation |
References
- NVD — CVE-2025-63823
- OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide — Hardcoded Credentials
- OWASP MASVS — M9: Insecure Authentication