SECURITYCRITICALCVE-2026-11756

CVE-2026-11756: Critical Unauthenticated RCE in Dassault 3DEXPERIENCE

A CVSS 10.0 deserialization vulnerability in the 3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher App allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on any...

Dylan H.

Security Team

July 28, 2026
4 min read
CVE-2026-11756: Critical Unauthenticated RCE in Dassault 3DEXPERIENCE

Critical severity

Rated critical. Prioritise patching — see the remediation guidance below.

Affected Products

  • 3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher App R2023x
  • 3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher App R2024x
  • 3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher App R2025x
  • 3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher App R2026x

Executive Summary

A maximum-severity deserialization vulnerability in the 3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher App allows an unauthenticated, network-adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code on any workstation running the affected application. Dassault Systèmes' 3DEXPERIENCE platform is a core PLM/CAD/simulation suite heavily used in aerospace, automotive, and defence manufacturing — making this vulnerability exceptionally high-impact in industrial and supply chain contexts.

CVSS Score: 10.0 (Critical)

The vulnerability (CWE-502 — Deserialization of Untrusted Data) requires no authentication and no user interaction. A patch has been issued via the Dassault Systèmes Trust Center.


Vulnerability Overview

AttributeValue
CVE IDCVE-2026-11756
CVSS Score10.0 (Critical)
CWECWE-502 — Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Attack VectorNetwork
Authentication RequiredNone
User InteractionNone
Confidentiality ImpactHigh
Integrity ImpactHigh
Availability ImpactHigh

Affected Versions

ProductAffected ReleasesStatus
3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher AppR2023x through R2026xPatch Available

Technical Details

The Station Launcher App is a client-side component embedded in Dassault's 3DEXPERIENCE ecosystem that handles application launch orchestration across the PLM suite. The vulnerability stems from the Launcher's deserialization pipeline, which processes attacker-supplied network input without validating or sanitising object graphs before instantiation.

How Deserialization Exploits Work

1. Attacker identifies a 3DEXPERIENCE workstation with Station Launcher exposed
2. Attacker crafts a malicious serialized payload (gadget chain targeting available Java/native libraries)
3. Payload sent to the Launcher's listening service — no credentials required
4. Launcher deserializes the payload, instantiating attacker-controlled objects
5. Gadget chain triggers arbitrary OS command execution in the Launcher process context
6. Full compromise of the workstation — lateral movement, credential harvest, CAD/PLM data exfiltration

Impact in Industrial Environments

3DEXPERIENCE is widely deployed in sectors where workstations hold high-value intellectual property:

SectorTypical Risk
AerospaceAirframe/engine CAD models, simulation results
AutomotiveVehicle platform data, proprietary tooling designs
DefenceControlled technical documents (potential export control violation)
ManufacturingProduction process IP, supplier chain data

A single exploited workstation provides a foothold for lateral movement across corporate networks — particularly dangerous in environments where 3DEXPERIENCE is integrated with ERP, PLM, and engineering data management systems.


Remediation

Immediate Actions

1. Apply the Dassault Systèmes Security Patch

Obtain the update from the official advisory at:

https://www.3ds.com/trust-center/security/security-advisories

Follow the release-specific patching guide for your 3DEXPERIENCE release (R2023x–R2026x).

2. Network-Level Mitigation (if immediate patching is not possible)

Restrict access to the Station Launcher service at the host firewall:

# Block inbound connections to the Launcher's listening port from untrusted networks
# (Identify the specific port via netstat/ss on affected workstations)
# Windows:
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block 3DX Launcher External" ^
  dir=in action=block protocol=TCP localport=<launcher_port>
 
# Linux:
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <launcher_port> -j DROP

3. Monitor for Exploitation Indicators

# Look for anomalous child processes spawned from the Launcher process
# Windows Event Log — suspicious process creation under Station Launcher
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4688} |
  Where-Object {$_.Message -match 'launcher' -or $_.Message -match '3dx'}
 
# Check for unexpected outbound connections from workstations
netstat -an | findstr ESTABLISHED

Detection Indicators

IndicatorSignificance
Unexpected child processes under Station LauncherActive exploitation
Inbound connections to Launcher port from non-3DS hostsReconnaissance or attack
New scheduled tasks or autorun entries post-compromisePersistence mechanisms
Outbound C2 beaconing from 3DEXPERIENCE workstationsPost-exploitation activity
Unexplained access to CAD/PLM file storesData exfiltration

Post-Remediation Checklist

  1. Confirm patch applied to all 3DEXPERIENCE workstations in scope
  2. Audit Launcher process activity logs for signs of prior exploitation
  3. Rotate credentials for accounts that ran the Station Launcher App
  4. Review network firewall rules — restrict Launcher reachability to authorised hosts only
  5. Verify integrity of CAD/PLM repositories for signs of data access or modification
  6. Coordinate with Dassault Systèmes support for further technical guidance

References