Executive Summary
A maximum-severity deserialization vulnerability in the 3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher App allows an unauthenticated, network-adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code on any workstation running the affected application. Dassault Systèmes' 3DEXPERIENCE platform is a core PLM/CAD/simulation suite heavily used in aerospace, automotive, and defence manufacturing — making this vulnerability exceptionally high-impact in industrial and supply chain contexts.
CVSS Score: 10.0 (Critical)
The vulnerability (CWE-502 — Deserialization of Untrusted Data) requires no authentication and no user interaction. A patch has been issued via the Dassault Systèmes Trust Center.
Vulnerability Overview
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-11756 |
| CVSS Score | 10.0 (Critical) |
| CWE | CWE-502 — Deserialization of Untrusted Data |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Authentication Required | None |
| User Interaction | None |
| Confidentiality Impact | High |
| Integrity Impact | High |
| Availability Impact | High |
Affected Versions
| Product | Affected Releases | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 3DEXPERIENCE Station Launcher App | R2023x through R2026x | Patch Available |
Technical Details
The Station Launcher App is a client-side component embedded in Dassault's 3DEXPERIENCE ecosystem that handles application launch orchestration across the PLM suite. The vulnerability stems from the Launcher's deserialization pipeline, which processes attacker-supplied network input without validating or sanitising object graphs before instantiation.
How Deserialization Exploits Work
1. Attacker identifies a 3DEXPERIENCE workstation with Station Launcher exposed
2. Attacker crafts a malicious serialized payload (gadget chain targeting available Java/native libraries)
3. Payload sent to the Launcher's listening service — no credentials required
4. Launcher deserializes the payload, instantiating attacker-controlled objects
5. Gadget chain triggers arbitrary OS command execution in the Launcher process context
6. Full compromise of the workstation — lateral movement, credential harvest, CAD/PLM data exfiltrationImpact in Industrial Environments
3DEXPERIENCE is widely deployed in sectors where workstations hold high-value intellectual property:
| Sector | Typical Risk |
|---|---|
| Aerospace | Airframe/engine CAD models, simulation results |
| Automotive | Vehicle platform data, proprietary tooling designs |
| Defence | Controlled technical documents (potential export control violation) |
| Manufacturing | Production process IP, supplier chain data |
A single exploited workstation provides a foothold for lateral movement across corporate networks — particularly dangerous in environments where 3DEXPERIENCE is integrated with ERP, PLM, and engineering data management systems.
Remediation
Immediate Actions
1. Apply the Dassault Systèmes Security Patch
Obtain the update from the official advisory at:
https://www.3ds.com/trust-center/security/security-advisories
Follow the release-specific patching guide for your 3DEXPERIENCE release (R2023x–R2026x).
2. Network-Level Mitigation (if immediate patching is not possible)
Restrict access to the Station Launcher service at the host firewall:
# Block inbound connections to the Launcher's listening port from untrusted networks
# (Identify the specific port via netstat/ss on affected workstations)
# Windows:
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block 3DX Launcher External" ^
dir=in action=block protocol=TCP localport=<launcher_port>
# Linux:
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <launcher_port> -j DROP3. Monitor for Exploitation Indicators
# Look for anomalous child processes spawned from the Launcher process
# Windows Event Log — suspicious process creation under Station Launcher
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4688} |
Where-Object {$_.Message -match 'launcher' -or $_.Message -match '3dx'}
# Check for unexpected outbound connections from workstations
netstat -an | findstr ESTABLISHEDDetection Indicators
| Indicator | Significance |
|---|---|
| Unexpected child processes under Station Launcher | Active exploitation |
| Inbound connections to Launcher port from non-3DS hosts | Reconnaissance or attack |
| New scheduled tasks or autorun entries post-compromise | Persistence mechanisms |
| Outbound C2 beaconing from 3DEXPERIENCE workstations | Post-exploitation activity |
| Unexplained access to CAD/PLM file stores | Data exfiltration |
Post-Remediation Checklist
- Confirm patch applied to all 3DEXPERIENCE workstations in scope
- Audit Launcher process activity logs for signs of prior exploitation
- Rotate credentials for accounts that ran the Station Launcher App
- Review network firewall rules — restrict Launcher reachability to authorised hosts only
- Verify integrity of CAD/PLM repositories for signs of data access or modification
- Coordinate with Dassault Systèmes support for further technical guidance