Executive Summary
CVE-2026-16259 affects the Uix UserCenter WordPress plugin (versions through 1.0.3) and carries a maximum-severity CVSS score of 9.8. The plugin exposes an unauthenticated profile-update action that never verifies the account being modified actually belongs to the person making the request. Instead, the action is "secured" by a token whose signing key is hardcoded and identical across every installation of the plugin — meaning anyone who has the key (trivially recoverable from the plugin's own source) can forge a valid token for any account on any site running it.
CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)
There is no patched version available as of this advisory. Sites running Uix UserCenter should treat every user account, including administrator accounts, as potentially takeover-able until the plugin is removed or a fix ships.
Vulnerability Overview
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-16259 |
| CVSS Score | 9.8 (Critical) |
| Type | Broken Access Control / Unauthenticated Account Takeover |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Privileges Required | None |
| User Interaction | None |
| Root Cause | Hardcoded, install-wide token signing key |
Affected Versions
| Product | Affected Versions | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| Uix UserCenter (WordPress plugin) | All versions through 1.0.3 | No fix available — deactivate and remove until patched |
Technical Details
Uix UserCenter ships a profile-update endpoint intended to let logged-in users edit their own account. Two design flaws combine into full account takeover:
- Missing ownership check. The endpoint accepts a target account identifier in the request but never confirms that identifier matches the requester's own session or identity.
- Hardcoded signing key. Instead of relying on WordPress's own authentication/nonce system, the action is authorized by a bearer-style token signed with a key that is baked into the plugin's code and therefore identical on every single install — not per-site, not per-secret, not rotated.
Because the signing key never changes between installations, an attacker only needs to obtain the plugin's public distribution (trivial, since it's a WordPress.org-style plugin) to extract the key once and reuse it forever, against any site running the plugin. From there, forging a valid token for an arbitrary user ID — including a site's administrator account — is enough to modify that account's profile fields, which in practice extends to takeover-relevant data such as the account email address, from which a password reset can be triggered.
Attack Vector
1. Attacker downloads/extracts the Uix UserCenter plugin source
2. Attacker recovers the hardcoded signing key (same across all installs)
3. Attacker forges a signed profile-update token for an arbitrary target user ID
4. Attacker sends the unauthenticated profile-update request to the target site
5. Target account's profile (e.g. registered email) is modified without owner consent
6. Attacker triggers a password reset against the now-attacker-controlled email
7. Attacker gains full control of the compromised account, including admin accountsImpact of Successful Exploitation
| Impact | Description |
|---|---|
| Account Takeover | Any account on the site, including administrators, can be hijacked |
| No Authentication Barrier | Exploitation requires no credentials and no user interaction |
| Site-Wide Compromise | Admin account takeover extends to full WordPress site compromise (plugins, themes, database) |
| Cross-Site Impact | The identical hardcoded key means the same exploit code works unmodified against every vulnerable install |
Immediate Remediation
Step 1: Check Exposure
# From the WordPress admin dashboard or via WP-CLI:
wp plugin list --status=active | grep -i usercenterStep 2: Remove or Deactivate
Because no fixed version currently exists, the only reliable mitigation is:
- Deactivate and remove the Uix UserCenter plugin immediately.
- Force a password reset for all user accounts, prioritizing administrator and editor roles.
- Review recent profile-update activity in your hosting or application logs for signs of prior exploitation.
If the Plugin Cannot Be Removed Immediately
- Block requests to the plugin's profile-update endpoint at the web server or WAF level.
- Restrict WordPress admin login to known IP ranges as a compensating control.
- Enable multi-factor authentication for all privileged accounts so a hijacked email alone cannot complete account takeover.
Detection Indicators
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
| Unexpected profile/email changes on user accounts | Possible exploitation of the forged-token flow |
| Password reset requests immediately following an unexplained email change | Sign of an in-progress takeover |
| Requests to the plugin's profile-update endpoint from unauthenticated sessions | Direct evidence of exploitation attempts |
Post-Remediation Steps
- Confirm removal of the Uix UserCenter plugin across all affected sites.
- Audit all user accounts for unauthorized email or profile changes made before removal.
- Rotate credentials for any account whose email address may have been altered.
- Monitor vendor channels for a fixed release before reinstalling the plugin.
- Track NVD/WPScan for an updated advisory with a patched version number.