Executive Summary
A critical remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-8838) has been disclosed in the Amazon Redshift Python driver (amazon-redshift-python-driver). Versions below 2.1.14 are affected. The vector_in() function in the driver executes arbitrary code received from the server using Python's built-in dynamic code execution capability — without any sanitization or validation of the server-provided data.
CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) CWE: CWE-95 — Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code
Any application connecting to an Amazon Redshift instance via this driver is potentially vulnerable if the connection can be intercepted (man-in-the-middle) or if the Redshift endpoint itself is compromised. Upgrade to version 2.1.14 immediately.
Vulnerability Overview
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-8838 |
| CVSS Score | 9.8 (Critical) |
| CWE | CWE-95 — Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code |
| Type | Remote Code Execution (client-side) |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Privileges Required | None |
| User Interaction | None |
| Fixed Version | amazon-redshift-python-driver 2.1.14+ |
Affected Products
| Product | Vulnerable Versions | Patched Version |
|---|---|---|
| amazon-redshift-python-driver (PyPI) | All versions below 2.1.14 | 2.1.14 and above |
Technical Analysis
Root Cause
The vector_in() function in the Amazon Redshift Python driver is responsible for deserializing vector data type values returned by a Redshift server response. The implementation uses Python's dynamic code execution function to process the server-returned data string — treating the server response as executable code rather than as plain data to be parsed.
This design pattern is inherently dangerous because:
- The server controls the input — In a MITM scenario or with a compromised server, an attacker controls exactly what string is passed to the execution function
- No sandboxing — The execution occurs in the full Python runtime context with all available modules and capabilities
- Client-side execution — The vulnerability affects the connecting client machine, not the server
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
An attacker positioned between the client application and the Redshift endpoint intercepts the TLS-encrypted connection (using a fraudulent certificate, DNS spoofing, or BGP hijacking) and injects a malicious payload in place of a legitimate server vector data response:
# Malicious server response injects arbitrary code
# instead of legitimate vector data
Scenario 2: Compromised or Rogue Server
An attacker who has compromised the Redshift endpoint — or who tricks an application into connecting to a malicious Redshift-compatible server — can return crafted responses that execute arbitrary code on any connecting client.
Scenario 3: DNS Spoofing / Endpoint Substitution
If an attacker can manipulate DNS resolution for the Redshift endpoint hostname, client applications will connect to a malicious server that exploits this vulnerability to achieve RCE on the client.
Impact Scope
The vulnerability executes code on the client machine — meaning the affected party is the application server, data pipeline, ETL job, or analytics environment that uses this driver to query Redshift. This could include:
- Production application servers with database access
- Data engineering pipelines and ETL jobs
- Jupyter notebooks and analytical environments
- AWS Lambda functions or container workloads using the driver
Impact Assessment
| Impact Area | Description |
|---|---|
| Client-Side RCE | Arbitrary code executed with the privileges of the Python application process |
| Credential Theft | AWS credentials, database passwords, API keys accessible from the process context |
| Data Exfiltration | Query results, application data, secrets can be exfiltrated |
| Lateral Movement | From compromised application server to internal network or cloud resources |
| Supply Chain Risk | ETL pipelines that process Redshift data are high-value targets |
Immediate Remediation
Step 1: Upgrade the Driver
Upgrade amazon-redshift-python-driver to version 2.1.14 or later:
# Check current installed version
pip show amazon-redshift-python-driver
# Upgrade to patched version
pip install --upgrade amazon-redshift-python-driver
# Or pin to a specific safe version
pip install "amazon-redshift-python-driver>=2.1.14"
# Verify the upgrade
pip show amazon-redshift-python-driver | grep VersionFor projects using requirements.txt or pyproject.toml:
# requirements.txt — update the pinned version
amazon-redshift-python-driver>=2.1.14
# pyproject.toml (Poetry or similar)
amazon-redshift-python-driver = ">=2.1.14"
# After updating, reinstall dependencies
pip install -r requirements.txt
# or
poetry update amazon-redshift-python-driverStep 2: Verify TLS Certificate Validation
Ensure your Redshift connection configuration enforces TLS certificate validation to reduce MITM risk:
import redshift_connector
conn = redshift_connector.connect(
host='your-cluster.region.redshift.amazonaws.com',
database='dev',
user='username',
password='password',
ssl=True,
sslmode='verify-full', # Enforce full certificate verification
)Step 3: Use VPC Endpoints
For AWS-hosted workloads, restrict Redshift connectivity to use VPC endpoints, eliminating the MITM attack surface:
# Create a Redshift VPC endpoint if not already in place
aws ec2 create-vpc-endpoint \
--vpc-id vpc-xxxxxxxx \
--service-name com.amazonaws.region.redshift \
--vpc-endpoint-type Interface \
--subnet-ids subnet-xxxxxxxxStep 4: Review Connection Configurations
Audit all locations where amazon-redshift-python-driver is used in your codebase:
# Find all uses of the Redshift driver
grep -r "redshift_connector\|amazon-redshift" . --include="*.py" -l
# Check for any connections without SSL enforcement
grep -r "ssl=False\|sslmode.*disable" . --include="*.py"Detection Indicators
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
| Unexpected outbound connections from application servers | Code execution reaching out to attacker infrastructure |
| Anomalous Python process behaviour | Import of unexpected modules, file writes outside normal paths |
| AWS CloudTrail anomalies | Unusual API calls from application server IAM roles |
| Redshift audit logs | Unusual query patterns or connection sources |
# Check for unexpected child processes from Python
ps aux | grep python
# Review network connections from application server
ss -tnp | grep python
# Check CloudWatch/CloudTrail for anomalous API calls
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
--lookup-attributes AttributeKey=Username,AttributeValue=your-app-role \
--start-time $(date -d '24 hours ago' -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)Post-Remediation Checklist
- Upgrade all environments (dev, staging, production) to
amazon-redshift-python-driver>=2.1.14 - Rotate AWS credentials, database passwords, and any secrets accessible from affected application environments
- Enforce TLS certificate validation (
sslmode=verify-full) on all Redshift connections - Restrict Redshift access to VPC endpoints where possible
- Audit recent application logs for anomalous behaviour consistent with exploitation
- Update dependency lockfiles (
requirements.txt,Pipfile.lock,poetry.lock) and rebuild containers - Scan your dependency tree for other packages with similar unsafe dynamic execution patterns