Overview
The South Asian cyberespionage group Bitter (also tracked as APT-C-08, APT-Q-37, Hazy Tiger, Orange Yali, T-APT-17, and TA397) has been observed targeting South Asian organizations with a previously unreported remote access trojan, PapRAT. Fortinet FortiGuard Labs researcher Cara Lin reported that it has both C++ and Rust implementations.
Capabilities
Common features include command execution, file upload and download, file deletion, directory and drive enumeration, and screenshot capture. The MSI-delivered version supports eight commands:
| Command | Function |
|---|---|
| MSG | Remote shell |
| FDD | Directory listing |
| DEL | File deletion |
| RUN | Arbitrary execution |
| GDR | Drive enumeration |
| SS1 | Screenshot |
| UPP | Upload to C2 |
| DWW | Download from C2 |
The Rust version adds MS2 (PowerShell execution), SLP (sleep and polling resumption), and BYE (process termination).
Infection Chains
- A Windows LNK file abuses the native
ftp.exeutility to run scripts and create scheduled tasks for C2 contact. - A VHDX disk image holds an LNK that opens a decoy Excel spreadsheet while silently running an MSI installer that deploys PapRAT.
- A URL shortcut fetches an LNK over WebDAV, leading to an MSI installer. A related chain uses a script that downloads an MSI via curl, and PapRAT then drops WmRAT, a malware family previously tied to Bitter.
Infrastructure and Behavior
- A living-off-the-land script contacts
goodnfortunes[.]comto collect directory and task lists, Desktop, Documents and Downloads contents, installed antivirus data, and mounted drives. Results are saved asabc.pdf, sent via curl, and deleted. - A second script fetches
talk.logfromtechtalkhelp[.]com, holding Base64-encoded PowerShell that pulls further instructions. - The MSI-delivered PapRAT uses
rivingtonclarks[.]comas its upload C2 endpoint.
Commands are updated server-side, so the operators can change behavior without shipping a new binary, avoiding PE drops and process injection that security tools might flag.
Defensive Guidance
- Treat unexpected LNK files, URL shortcuts, disk images, and MSI packages with caution, especially from unsolicited messages.
- Monitor behavior across scripting tools, scheduled tasks, and installer activity rather than relying only on known signatures.
- Block or alert on the domains above and on
ftp.exelaunched with script arguments. - Restrict mounting of VHDX/ISO images from email and downloads where practical.